Truman, MacArthur and the Korean War by Wainstock Dennis D.;

Author:Wainstock, Dennis D.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Enigma Books
Published: 2011-05-16T04:00:00+00:00

Optimism

In the X Corps sector, on November 21 the U.S. 17th Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division reached Hyesanjin on the Yalu River. Nearly a month earlier, ROK troops had reached the border at Chosan, but the first Chinese Communist offensive had forced them to retreat. Now, for the first time, American troops stood at the Yalu, at a spot where the river had dwindled to a small, shallow stream, fifty to seventy-five yards wide. American soldiers could see Chinese sentries walking their beats on the Siberian side of the river.22

Seven days later, another unit of the 7th Infantry Division, a platoon of K Company, 32nd Infantry, reached Singalpajin on the Yalu. The ROK troops at Chosan, and the American troops at Hyesanjin and Singalpajin, were the only U.N. forces that reached the border and saw the Yalu.

Meanwhile, America’s allies were becoming increasingly concerned that the Korean War would become the spark for another world war. Britain worried that American leaders were ignoring the agreed-upon principle that “an extension of the Korean War must be avoided.”23 Australia called for “careful examination,” and Sweden, Burma, and the Netherlands “were ready to go to any length to aid North Korea.”24 Moreover, the Allies distrusted MacArthur, fearing his reputation for not being “sufficiently responsive to Washington’s directives,” and this added to their general concern.25

Earlier, on November 13, under the joint supervision of the United Nations and Red China, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin proposed a buffer zone south of the Yalu. Calling it appeasement, MacArthur said that “to give up a portion of North Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists would be the greatest defeat to the free world in recent times.”26 To the Chinese Communists, however, Bevin’s proposal meant “annexation of the rest of Korea by Syngman Rhee,” and they brushed it aside as “irrelevant.”27

To discuss the growing anxiety of the Allies over the rise in the possibility of war with China, representatives from Defense and State assembled at the Pentagon on November 21. They included Marshall, Lovett, Pace, Bradley, Collins, Sherman, and Vandenberg for Defense and Acheson, Rusk, Jessup, and H. Freeman Matthews for State. Harriman represented an absent Truman. Although all of the participants agreed on the need to avert war with Red China, none of them suggested either canceling or delaying the offensive.28 Bradley said that they were reluctant to meddle in the theater commander’s job, but the almost unanimous assumption among them was that the offensive would succeed.29

On November 24, the Eighth Army’s D-Day, MacArthur issued a communiqué to the troops. It said that the Air Force had successfully interdicted enemy lines of support from the north, curtailing both reinforcement and essential supplies. On this morning, the eastern sector of the pincer had reached an enveloping position, cutting in two the northern reaches of the enemy’s geographical potential, and on the western sector of the pincer, the Eighth Army would now move forward in general assault to complete the compression and “close the vise.” If successful,

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